This is a cellphone-detector schematic diagram figure 1
The Bureau of Prisons lacks a sound evaluation plan for testing anti-cell phone technology deployed within federal prisons, says the Government Accountability Office.
figure 1. Cellphone detector schematic diagram |
The Bureau of Prisons lacks a sound evaluation plan for testing anti-cell phone technology deployed within federal prisons, says the Government Accountability Office.
Confiscation of contraband cell phones at some federal prisons is
more than doubling each year, leading the federal government to
increasingly look to technology as possible solution.
The Government Accountability Office, in a report dated Sept. 6--it's
actually a redacted version of a report the GAO issued in July--says
two federal prisons have implemented large-scale, sensor-based cell
phone detection systems. But officials from the bureau's Office of
Security Technologies told GAO auditors that the systems haven't been
subjected to any evaluation assessing whether widespread adoption would
be feasible and effective.
In other cases of cell phone detection technology testing, prison
officials simply never informed OST that the test was occurring, leaving
OST officials to hear about it only second-hand from vendors, GAO
auditors say OST officials told them.
OST officials also said test results from different prisons can be
inconsistent because the individuals conducting the testing can vary
from a computer specialist to a correctional officer--individuals with
different skills and knowledge levels.
The bureau says any anti-cell phone technology deployed within
prisons cannot interfere with signals outsider the secure perimeter, nor
can they collect information about end-user device utilization outside
the perimeter.
Jamming strictly within the confines of a federal prison, however, is
legally permissible so long as the prison has authorization from the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
A December 2010 report from the NTIA says the bureau has generally
concluded that existing anti-cell technology solutions have
shortcomings, such as not detecting all commercial cellular signals,
having a very short detection distance or being unable to affix the
location of an active cell phone due to the amount of signal reflection
caused by the huge quantities of metal inside prisons.
Hand-held detection devices suffer the failing of being easy for
inmates to adjust to--they simply shut off the phones if they see staff
coming with a portable device, the NTIA report says. Existing commercial
solutions might also be too sophisticated or expensive for daily
operation by a non-technical staff or just be impractical to implement
in prison compounds that have large acreage and dozens of buildings, the
NTIA report says.
In response to an NTIA notice of inquiry made in advance of the
report, many wireless industry firms expressed concern over the
potential for prison jamming to cause wider interference or possibly
obstruct land mobile radio communications. Another commentator said
testing conducted by the NTIA itself demonstrates that jamming can work
without interference or compromising public safety.
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